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Abstract. Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of
study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science, with
knowledge ﬂowing in either direction. On the one hand, computational
social choice is concerned with importing concepts and procedures from
social choice theory for solving questions that arise in computer science
and AI application domains. This is typically the case for managing
societies of autonomous agents, which calls for negotiation and voting
procedures. On the other hand, computational social choice is concerned
with importing notions and methods from computer science for solving
questions originally stemming from social choice, for instance by pro-
viding new perspectives on the problem of manipulation and control in
elections. This Dagstuhl Seminar has been devoted to the presentation
of recent results and an exchange of ideas in this growing research ﬁeld.
Keywords. Computational social choice, voting theory, fair division,
mechanism design, coalition formation, complexity theory, preference
representation, algorithms
1 Motivation
For a few years now, computer scientists (especially in Artiﬁcial Intelligence)
have been taking more and more of an interest in collective decision making.
There are two main reasons for that, leading to two diﬀerent lines of research.
Roughly speaking, the ﬁrst one is concerned with importing concepts and pro-
cedures from social choice theory for solving questions that arise in computer
science and AI application domains. This is typically the case for managing so-
cieties of autonomous agents, which calls for negotiation and voting procedures.
The second line of research goes the other way round: it is concerned with import-
ing notions and methods from computer science for solving questions originally
stemming from social choice.
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Social choice theory is concerned with designing and evaluating methods
of collective decision making. Solving a problem in social choice theory often
amounts to proving the existence (or non-existence) of a procedure for collective
decision making meeting certain requirements. However, to date computational
issues have not received enough attention in social choice. This is one place
where computer science comes into play. For instance, the classical impossibility
result stating that any non-dictatorial voting procedure is manipulable can be
bypassed by ensuring that manipulation is suﬃciently hard to compute, which
has called for complexity studies of manipulation problems. Another example is
the study of elicitation, compact representation, and aggregation of preferences
in combinatorial domains. This line of research has emerged from work in the AI
community on logical and graphical representation languages. These languages
are designed to allow for representing, in as little space as possible, a preference
structure whose size would be prohibitively large if it were to be represented
explicitly. Yet another example is the ﬁeld of social software originating in the
computational logic community, which is concerned with the application of logic-
based techniques for speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation to the analysis of social choice
procedures, to prove, for instance, the correctness of a fair division algorithm. As
a ﬁnal example of how the application of methods from computer science to prob-
lems of social choice can open up new research areas we mention here the idea of
automated mechanism design, which aims at developing algorithms to generate
social mechanisms for speciﬁc problem instances automatically. This approach
can sometimes circumvent classical impossibility results from economics, which
apply to the design of mechanisms for entire classes of problems, rather than to
the speciﬁc problem instances at hand.
The aim of this Dagstuhl Seminar was to address all lines of work concerning
computational issues in social choice, to a broad extent: this includes algorithmic
and complexity-theoretic studies of social choice problems (both at the level of
the agent and at that of the mechanism), but also, more generally, research that
aims at importing concepts or methods from computer science to study social
choice mechanisms.
2 Scientiﬁc Programme
The Dagstuhl Seminar on Computational Issues in Social Choice brought to-
gether leading researchers from several areas, including Social Choice, Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, and Theoretical Computer Science. It gathered 44 participants from
13 countries, namely: Australia, 1; Austria, 1; France, 11; Germany, 5; Israel, 1;
Italy, 3; Luxembourg, 2; The Netherlands, 5; New Zealand, 1; Switzerland, 1;
UK, 5; USA, 7.
The technical programme of the seminar included regular talks as well as an
open discussion and a rump session. There were 30 regular talks, most of them
on the following topics:
 complexity of voting;
 strategic behaviour in voting;
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 computational barriers against strategic behaviour;
 voting games;
 coalitional games and coalition formation;
 fair division and barter exchange markets;
 preference representation and voting on multi-issue domains;
 mechanism design.
The topic of the open discussion was Complexity of Voting. It was lead by Lane
Hemaspaandra (University of Rochester, USA). It lead to a stimulating two-hour
discussion involving many participants (including several students). The aim of
the rump session was to allow for participants to expose, in ﬁve minutes, a new
idea on any subject.
3 Conclusion
We found the seminar successful, especially in terms of the following achieve-
ments: First, the seminar made participants aware of a commonality of interests
across diﬀerent disciplines. Second, it suggested new directions for research that
will probably be taken up by researchers in the next couple of years; in partic-
ular, some new areas of social choice emerged from interaction with computer
scientists (such as the computational barriers to strategic behaviour, false-name
proofness, or voting on very large domains). Last, student participants got very
involved in the discussions.
The ﬁeld is more promising than ever, and we expect the community to
broaden up in the next couple of years. The next event aiming at gathering the
community will be the 2nd International Workshop on Computational Social
Choice (Liverpool, September 2008).
